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The Comparative Distinctiveness 
of Equity
Justice Mark Leeming 
Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales*
Comparative law is difficult and controversial. One reason for the difficulty is the 
complexity of legal systems and the need for more than a merely superficial knowledge 
of the foreign legal system in order to profit from recourse to it. One way in which it 
is controversial is that it has been suggested that the use of comparative law conceals 
the reasons for decisions reached on other grounds. This paper maintains that equity is 
distinctive, and that one of the ways in which equity is different from other bodies of 
law is that there is greater scope for the development of equitable principle by reference 
to foreign jurisdictions. That difference is a product of equity’s distinctive history, 
underlying themes and approach to law-making. Those matters are illustrated by a series 
of recent examples drawn from appellate courts throughout the Commonwealth. 
*  I am grateful for the assistance provided by Kate Lindeman and Hannah 
Vieira in the preparation of this article. All errors are mine.
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I. Introduction
This paper is about the ways in which courts within the Commonwealth look to each others’ decisions for guidance. It considers whether that 
occurs in ways that turn on the nature of the litigation, and, especially, 
when courts are dealing with equitable principles. Its principal contention 
is that courts use comparative law in a distinctive way when developing 
and applying principles of equity. It seeks to give a series of examples and 
thereby to identify plausible reasons for that contention. 
II. The Problem of Generality
One problem with many statements as to the use of comparative law 
is that they are too general. It is worth reiterating Professor Nelson’s 
observation that “[c]ommon-law decisionmaking is extraordinarily 
complex, and it may not lend itself to a unitary description”.1 The ways 
in which foreign law is used by courts in the common law tradition are 
quite nuanced. Much may be lost in generalities. 
It is one thing for a court to have regard to foreign law when an 
issue of general policy is to be determined, particularly when the court 
1. Caleb Nelson, “The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law” (2015) 
101:1 Virginia Law Review 1 at 8.
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is an ultimate appellate court.2 For example, should advocates have an 
absolute immunity for negligence? Should a plaintiff harmed by exposure 
to asbestos fail because he or she cannot prove precisely when the exposure 
occurred? Should a legal system recognise a claim for wrongful birth? 
Examples could readily be multiplied. Courts faced with such questions 
will regularly seek to gain assistance from the experience in a comparable 
legal system. This is a perfectly legitimate (and recurrent) approach to 
assist in the resolution of common legal issues. Sir Basil Markesinis 
and Dr. Fedtke have observed that “[t]he similarity of the problem, 
coupled with the growing similarity in socio-economic environments 
(at any rate among developed nations), may call for a similarity in legal 
outcome notwithstanding undoubted differences in language and legal 
techniques”.3 Many or most readers will be familiar with the Australian, 
Canadian, New Zealand and United Kingdom solutions to the particular 
questions — all tortious — mentioned above.4
The fact that courts — especially ultimate appellate courts — employ 
a comparative approach on such issues is unquestionably true, but it is 
not the sort of use of foreign decisions addressed in this paper. Indeed, 
2. See e.g. Jones v Kaney, [2011] UKSC 13 (“[i]t is highly desirable that at 
this appellate level, in cases where issues of legal policy are concerned, 
the Court should be informed about the position in other common 
law countries” at para 76) and, conversely, as a strand of the reasoning 
rejecting a submission, in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Barclays 
Bank, [2006] UKHL 28 (“it is a notable feature of this appeal that the 
Commissioners adduce no comparative jurisprudence to support their 
argument” at para 20).
3. Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A 
New Source of Inspiration? (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006) at 125.
4. In relation to advocates’ immunity from suit see e.g. D’Orta-Ekenaike v 
Victoria Legal Aid, [2005] HCA 12 at para 61 and see now Attwells v 
Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd, [2016] HCA 16 (immunity reformulated, 
by reference to principles of finality); Lai v Chamberlains, [2006] 
NZSC 70; Arthur J S Hall v Simons, [2002] 1 AC 615 (HL)(immunity 
abrogated). In Canada, barristers’ immunity from suit was never part of 
the common law: see Demarco v Ungaro (1979), 21 OR (2d) 673 (Ont 
Ct J (Gen Div)); Henderson v Hagblom, 2003 SKCA 40, leave to appeal to 
SCC refused [2004] 1 SCR ix.
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it is open to criticisms which are not without force. Writing of the use 
of comparative law (ancient and modern) in the Fairchild v Glenhaven5 
appeal — ironically, itself much lauded as exemplary6 — Lord Hoffmann 
observed: “[t]he foreign authorities were cited in the way courts always use 
comparative law; as a rhetorical flourish, to lend support to a conclusion 
reached on independent grounds”.7 In a similar vein, Justice Scalia said 
that to “invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and 
ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry”.8 
There is a measure of rhetorical overstatement in both those passages. 
However, it is tolerably clear that ultimate appellate courts are not likely 
to determine issues of general policy by reason of foreign decisions. Local 
conditions are apt to prevail. The divergent solutions to the examples 
given above well illustrate this.9 
Now consider the other extreme. It is perfectly clear that comparative 
law has a large and often determinative role to play in cases turning on 
international conventions.10 A notable example is aviation litigation 
5. [2002] UKHL 22.
6. See e.g. Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 3 (“the House of Lords decision 
in Fairchild v Glenhaven, [2002] 1 AC 32 (HL) comes closer to the ideal 
we are advocating” at 48). 
7. Lord Hoffmann, “Fairchild and After” in Andrew Burrows, David 
Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds, Judge and Jurist: Essays in 
Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 63 (“the reasoning in Fairchild was simply that we thought it 
very unfair that an employer should be able to escape any liability for 
mesothelioma suffered by a worker whom he had negligently exposed 
to asbestos simply because the worker had also been (negligently or 
otherwise) exposed to asbestos by someone else” at 64). The antipathy 
between the two on this topic is evident from Lord Rodger’s dissent in 
Barker v Corus (UK), [2006] UKHL 20 and, especially, what is disclosed 
in Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme 
Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) at 189-90.
8. Dissenting, in Roper v Simmons (2005), 125 S Ct 1183 (US) at 1228.
9. Supra note 4.
10. See Jonathan Mance, “Foreign and Comparative Law in the Courts” 
(2001) 36:3 Texas International Law Journal 415 at 420-24 (this has long 
been the case, as his Lordship has observed).
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involving the Warsaw Convention11 and its successors, whose self-evident 
purpose was to harmonise the laws of all contracting States on the liability 
of carriers for the commercial carriage of passengers and cargo by air. It 
is trite that it is desirable that decisions in different jurisdictions should, 
so far as possible, be kept in line with each other in such cases; otherwise 
the purpose for entering into and implementing the treaty would be 
frustrated.12 This sort of use of foreign law, where a uniform legislative 
text is imposed from without, is once again, not what this paper addresses.
Between those two extremes, there lies an intermediate area, to which 
this paper is directed. The essential idea is found in the following passage 
from Lord Wilberforce’s speech in Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (Nos 
2 & 3):13
[w]hen the judicial approach to an identical problem between the same parties 
has been spelt out with such articulation in a country, one not only so closely 
akin to ours in legal approach, the fabric of whose legal doctrine in this area 
is so closely interwoven with ours, but that to which all the parties before us 
belong, spelt out moreover in convincing language and reasoning, we should 
be unwise not to take the benefit of it.14
This paper focuses upon what his Lordship said of legal approaches 
being akin, of the closely interwoven fabric of legal doctrine, and of 
11. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, 12 October 1929, 261 UNTS 423.
12. See e.g. Stott v Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd, [2014] UKSC 15 at paras 
34-44; Povey v Qantas Airways Ltd, [2005] HCA 33 (“[i]mportantly, 
international treaties should be interpreted uniformly by contracting 
states” at para 25); Emery Air Freight Corporation v Nerine Nurseries 
Ltd, [1997] 3 NZLR 723 (CA); Thibodeau v Air Canada, 2014 SCC 
67 at paras 52-57 (“[t]o sum up, the text and purpose of the Montreal 
Convention and a strong current of international jurisprudence show 
that actions for damages in relation to matters falling within the scope 
of the Montreal Convention may only be pursued if they are the types 
of actions specifically permitted under its provisions. As the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom put it very recently, ‘[t]he Convention 
is intended to deal comprehensively with the carrier’s liability for 
whatever may physically happen to passengers between embarkation and 
disembarkation’: Stott, at para 61” at para 57).
13. [1982] AC 888 (HL) [Buttes Gas & Oil Co].
14. Ibid at 936-37. 
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the language and reasoning being convincing.15 Equity decisions in the 
Commonwealth are capable of answering that description.
III. The Use of Foreign Equity Decisions
The use of foreign law, and in particular foreign decisions when 
developing and applying equitable principle, is illustrated by two recent 
judgments of the UK Supreme Court, both written by Lord Neuberger 
for a unanimous Court. Both decisions expressly employed a comparative 
approach. In 2014, the Court noted how other courts in other leading 
common law jurisdictions had departed from the United Kingdom in 
relation to whether a bribe received by a fiduciary was held on trust, 
overturned the English decision, Sinclair Investments Ltd v Versailles Trade 
Finance Ltd,16 and instead chose to follow principles adopted elsewhere 
in the Commonwealth.17 Lord Neuberger stated: 
[a]s overseas countries secede from the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, it 
is inevitable that inconsistencies in the common law will develop between 
different jurisdictions. However, it seems to us highly desirable for all those 
jurisdictions to learn from each other, and at least to lean in favour of 
harmonising the development of the common law round the world.18
In 2015, in an appeal in proceedings alleging passing-off, having 
considered Australian, Canadian, Irish and New Zealand authorities,19 
his Lordship reiterated the point:
it is both important and helpful to consider how the law has developed in 
other common law jurisdictions – important because it is desirable that the 
common law jurisdictions have a consistent approach, and helpful because 
every national common law judiciary can benefit from the experiences and 
thoughts of other common law judges.20
15. Ibid.
16. [2011] EWCA Civ 347.
17. FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, [2014] UKSC 
45 at para 45 [FHR]. See also the consideration of Australian, New 
Zealand and North American decisions in Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd, 
[2014] UKSC 13 at paras 241-43.
18. FHR, ibid.
19. Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group, [2015] UKSC 31 at 
paras 38-43.
20. Ibid at para 50.
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Those statements were not, as I read them, merely supportive of 
conclusions already reached.21 Indeed, a remarkable aspect of the first 
appeal is that the decision overturned a previous decision written by its 
author.22 Moreover, in the second appeal, the Supreme Court departed 
from Australian and Canadian authorities. 
Both appeals concerned questions of equitable principle. Here 
there is greater scope for harmonisation than in most mainstream areas 
of judge-made law.23 There are at least three reasons why. First, equity 
enjoys a longer readily comprehensible history than most areas of private 
law. There is simply more material to work with articulating a coherent 
legal tradition. Second, parts of equity are either unaffected by statute, 
or have been influenced by statute so long ago that the original statutory 
text has become unimportant, such that there is greater scope for, and 
ease of, the harmonisation process.24 Third, the underlying principles and 
maxims of equity tend to enhance a mode of reasoning apt to support 
a comparative approach. A foreign judgment is apt to be “spelt out in 
convincing language and reasoning” (to use Lord Wilberforce’s language) 
when its reasoning involves familiar themes and motivating principles 
common to equitable jurisprudence. 
 For the purposes of this paper, by “equity” and “equitable principle” 
I mean merely the doctrines and remedies deriving from Chancery. 
Professor (now Lord Justice) Beatson said, of “the unenacted law made 
up of common law and equity” that “[e]ach comes from a separate 
source with its own bundle of traditions. Each functions somewhat 
differently”.25 I appreciate that to some that historical definition may 
seem old-fashioned, unhelpful, or indeed one which distorts a more 
21. Cf. supra notes 7, 8.
22. Supra note 16.
23. Admiralty law is another such area, with a historical background in some 
respects resembling that of equity, but this is a matter beyond the scope of 
this paper.
24. See Mark Leeming, “Theories and Principles Underlying the Development 
of the Common Law: The Statutory Elephant in the Room” (2013) 36:3 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 1002 at 1004-05.
25. Jack Beatson, “Has the Common Law a Future?” (1997) 56:2 Cambridge 
Law Journal 291 at 298.
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coherent analysis of the legal system. I have elsewhere sought to explain 
why considering equity as a separate body of law within the legal system 
is a helpful approach.26 For present purposes, I observe merely that it 
is unquestionably the law of Australia,27 that the theme chosen by the 
Editors-in-Chief of this volume presupposes the continued utility of 
the term and that considerations of historical continuity are central to 
the thesis that foreign equity decisions are used in a distinctive manner. 
That said, as the passing-off appeal mentioned above illustrates, there are 
numerous differences at the level of detail within the Commonwealth. 
But that is no new thing, nor is it unhealthy. I turn to this immediately.
IV. The Variegated Common Law of the 
Commonwealth
There is a firmly established comparative law tradition in courts 
throughout the Commonwealth. In part that reflected the idea that there 
was a single common law (including equity). Appellate judges in England 
long sat in the Privy Council hearing appeals throughout the Empire and 
Commonwealth (as well as the substantial quantity of Scottish appeals 
to the House of Lords and the Supreme Court). Moreover, although 
originally the idea was that there was a single “common law of England” 
uniform throughout the British Empire, it became clear by the second 
half of the twentieth century that there were distinctive local varieties. 
Two tort appeals from Australia and New Zealand to the Privy Council 
26. See Mark Leeming, “Subrogation, Equity and Unjust Enrichment” in 
Jamie Glister & Pauline Ridge, eds, Fault Lines in Equity (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 27 at 39-43; Mark Leeming, “Equity: Ageless in an Age 
of Statutes” (2015) 9 Journal of Equity 108.
27. Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd, [2005] HCA 46 (the 
normative complexity of the Australian legal system derives from “the 
interaction between the rules of law, principles of equity, requirements of 
statute, and between legal, equitable and statutory remedies” at para 27). 
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illustrate the point.28 In the first, the Privy Council recognised that the 
Australian law of libel might diverge from that established in England, 
saying that it was a question for the High Court to decide whether 
the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard29 compelled a 
change in the law of libel in Australia.30 In the second, the Privy Council 
concluded that the New Zealand Court of Appeal was entitled to depart 
from English decisions on the grounds that conditions in New Zealand 
were different. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand “should not be 
deflected from developing the common law of New Zealand … by the 
consideration that the House of Lords … have not regarded an identical 
development as appropriate in the English setting”.31 
Those statements are remarkable for at least three matters which may 
be underappreciated. The first is that they were decisions when appeals 
lay as of right to the Privy Council, yet the men who constituted it also 
sat in the House of Lords and would in that capacity decide the same 
question of law differently. The second is that in both instances regard 
was expressly had to policy and different local conditions. The third is 
that the measure of deference accorded by the Judicial Committee is 
inconsistent with there being a single, monolithic body of common law 
throughout the Commonwealth.
28. See also Andrew Burrows, “The Influence of Comparative Law on the 
English Law of Obligations” in Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilbury, 
eds, The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015); William Gummow, “The Australian Constitution and 
the End of Empire – A Century of Legal History” (2015) 33:1 Law in 
Context 74 at 84; Mark Leeming, “Farah and Its Progeny: Comity among 
Intermediate Appellate Courts” (2015) 12:2 The Judicial Review 165 at 
168-69.
29. [1964] UKHL 1.
30. Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967), 17 CLR 221 (PC (Austl)) 
at 241.
31. Invercargill City Council v Hamlin, [1996] 2 WLR 367 (PC (NZ)) at 
376. Note the consideration of divergent Australian and Canadian 
developments in reaching that conclusion.
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V. Three Examples of Equitable Principle in 
Ultimate Appellate Courts
Below, I examine some of divergent workings-out of the same equitable 
principle by three ultimate appellate courts.
A. Barnes v Addy: Liability for Knowing Assistance in 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom
An area which is wholly equitable but where there are divergent views in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom is the liability of those who 
assist in a breach of fiduciary duty, even though liability in all places may 
be traced to Lord Selborne’s words in Barnes v Addy32 that “strangers are 
not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents 
of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, … unless they assist 
with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the 
trustees”.33
The Australian approach still requires there to have been a “dishonest 
and fraudulent design” by the fiduciary, as to which the third party 
assisted and had sufficient notice. Here, notice includes knowledge of the 
circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable 
person, but mere constructive notice is insufficient.34 Moreover, the High 
Court of Australia has emphasised that the formulation by Lord Selborne 
was not an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a person 
who was not a recipient of trust property and had not acted as a trustee de 
son tort might be liable.35 In particular, a person who induces or procures 
a trustee to commit a breach of trust will be liable irrespective of the 
32. (1874), LR 9 Ch App 144 (CA (Eng)).
33. Ibid at 251-52.
34. Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975), 132 CLR 373 
(HCA); Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007), 230 CLR 
89 (HCA) [Farah Constructions]; Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd, [2014] 
NSWCA 266 (Austl) [Hasler]; FTV Holdings Cairns Pty Ltd v Smith, 
[2014] QCA 217 (Austl) at paras 58-62; cf. Westpac Banking Corporation v 
Bell Group Ltd (No 3), [2012] WASCA 157 (Austl) at paras 2112-25 (on a 
more relaxed test of “dishonest and fraudulent design”).
35. Farah Constructions, ibid at para 161.
413(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
quality of the breach. A person who participates in the breach but falls 
short of inducing or procuring it will only be liable if the breach amounts 
to a dishonest and fraudulent design.36 That is a relatively nuanced 
formulation of accessorial liability, which reflects a close adherence to 
Lord Selborne’s words.
The approach in the United Kingdom was reformulated in Royal 
Brunei Airlines v Tan37 (“Royal Brunei”), where it was held that a third 
party could be liable, even for a wholly innocent breach by the fiduciary, 
if the third party had the requisite state of mind. There has been some 
fluctuation in Twinsectra v Yardley38 and Barlow Clowes International Ltd 
v Eurotrust International Ltd39 on the question of the third party’s state 
of mind.40 But whatever be the position on knowledge, the English test 
appears to subsume the distinction made in the Australian authorities. 
It seems that an intermediate position obtains in Canada. In the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Air Canada v M & L Travel Ltd,41 a more 
relaxed view appears to have been taken of the quality of the fiduciary’s 
breach. It was stated (obiter dicta) that equity would regard “the taking 
of a knowingly wrongful risk resulting in prejudice to the beneficiary” 
as “dishonest or fraudulent” such as to be “sufficient to ground personal 
liability”.42 Subsequently, as Professor Waters has observed, leave to appeal 
has been refused in a case where the trustee’s breach was not dishonest 
36. See Farah Constructions, ibid at para 164; Hasler, supra note 34 at paras 
77-78; Charles Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 1” 
(1986) 102:1 Law Quarterly Review 114 at 144.
37. [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC (Brunei)).
38. [2002] UKHL 12.
39. [2005] UKPC 37 (Isle of Man).
40. For insight into the differing formulations, see Paterson, supra note 7 at 
183-84.
41. [1993] 3 SCR 787 [Air Canada]. See also Citadel General Assurance Co v 
Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805; Gold v Rosenberg, [1997] 3 SCR 
767.
42. Air Canada, ibid at 826; McLachlin J expressly declined to decide this 
issue at 830.
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or fraudulent.43 It would appear that a settled position has not yet been 
reached.
It is not the purpose of this paper to criticise or to express a 
preference for any of the formulations as a matter of policy. Instead, it 
may be noted that close regard was given in each of the Australian and 
Canadian decisions to earlier United Kingdom authority. Indeed, prior 
to 2007, it was widely thought that the reformulation of liability in Royal 
Brunei reflected the Australian law.44 To use Lord Wilberforce’s words, 
“it is plain that this is an area where the jurisprudential fabric is closely 
interwoven”.45 Of course, that is largely a consequence of history. Each 
of the Australian colonies, and most of the Canadian colonies, inherited 
the law of England including equity. Each participated for many decades 
in a judicial system which culminated in appeals to the Privy Council. 
And in each case, liability exists at general law, relatively unaffected by 
statute. Although there are local divergences, it remains easy to compare 
and contrast those divergences. It is right to do so. Indeed, the High 
Court has reserved to itself the right to consider, in a future case, whether 
to adopt aspects of Royal Brunei as a matter of Australian law.46 The 
differences which presently exist result in large measure from decisions to 
relax the precedential weight accorded to much earlier English decisions 
— which is to say, precisely the phenomenon seen in the Privy Council 
tort appeals referred to above.47 Those differences do not deny either 
the shared historical basis for these forms of liability, nor the ability of 
courts readily to have regard — and at the level of fine-grained detail 
— to the reasoning processes of foreign courts. The common historical 
background makes it easier to undertake comparative analyses, and to do 
so not merely at the crude level of arguing that the outcome is preferable, 
43. Gordon v Winnipeg Canoe Club (1999), 134 Man R (2d) 213 (CA) 
leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2000) 153 Man R (2d) 160 (SCC); see 
Donovan WM Waters, Mark Gillen & Lionel Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts 
in Canada, 4d (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 517. 
44. See Hasler, supra note 34 at para 47.
45. Buttes Gas & Oil Co, supra note 13 at 936-37.
46. Farah Constructions, supra note 34 at paras 163-64.
47. See Part IV, above.
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but at a more sophisticated level, of assessing the extent to which there 
has been a distortion in a coherent body of law. 
B. Qualifications to the Rule in Saunders v Vautier
In some circumstances, in accordance with one aspect of the “rule”48 in 
Saunders v Vautier,49 fewer than all of a number of absolutely entitled 
adult beneficiaries can bring a trust to an end pro rata, by calling for the 
transfer of their shares of the trust property. May that occur where the 
trustee holds shares in a private company and the result is that there is a 
change of control in the company (e.g. by breaking up a blocking stake)? 
The “rule” may readily be seen in eighteenth century decisions,50 
as well as in the first edition of Lewin on Trusts,51 all of which pre-
dated Saunders v Vautier. A different path was taken by United States 
decisions, influenced by early New York and Michigan statutes.52 In 
Australia, much of Canada and England, one beneficiary can bring to 
an end a trust of divisible property pro rata, subject to there not being 
“special circumstances”. A continuous line of authority holds that the 
mere breaking up of a parcel of shares is insufficient to constitute special 
circumstances.53 However, if it is shown that the consequence is a loss in 
value, then there will be special circumstances. In Beck v Henley54 (“Beck”), 
48. The “rule” is better seen as a power on the part of the beneficiaries, with a 
correlative liability on the part of the trustee. See e.g. CPT Custodian Pty 
Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue, [2005] HCA 53 at para 44.
49. (1841), 41 ER 482 (Ch).
50. See e.g. Love v L’Estrange (1727), 2 ER 532 (HL); Barnes v Rowley (1797), 
30 ER 1024 (Ch).
51. See Thomas Lewin, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees 
(London: A Maxwell, 1837) at 496.
52. See Paul Matthews, “The Comparative Importance of the Rule in 
Saunders v Vautier” (2006) 122:2 Law Quarterly Review 266 at 282-87; 
see also Re Barton, [2002] EWHC 264 (Ch).
53. See In re Marshall, [1914] 1 Ch 192 (CA (Eng)); Re Sandeman’s Will 
Trusts, [1937] 1 All ER 368 (Ch); Re Weiner’s Will Trusts, [1956] 1 WLR 
579 (Ch (Eng)) and Lloyds Bank Ltd v Duker, [1987] 1 WLR 1324 (Ch 
(Eng)).
54. [2014] NSWCA 201 (Austl) [Beck].
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the New South Wales Court of Appeal was asked to depart from that 
line of authority.55 After considering the English decisions from which 
the “special circumstances” exception was derived, the Court held that it 
should not lightly depart from judicial authority that was “long standing 
and consistent”, and which had been applied and followed in other 
jurisdictions.56 Further, the Court considered the potential consequences 
of deviating, stating that “[i]t is not possible to quantify the costs — in 
terms of certainty, and upsetting the considered and informed desires of 
settlors, testators and beneficiaries, of the change in the law for which 
[the appellant] contends. All that can be said is that those costs would 
be real”.57 This was not a case where comparative law was cited merely to 
lend support to a conclusion reached on independent grounds.58
The same decision illustrates another distinctive equitable 
phenomenon: the antiquity of equitable doctrine. In areas such as tort 
and contract, which were radically reformulated from the second half of 
the nineteenth century,59 it is very hard to go back to the early nineteenth 
century (or earlier) in a way that assists legal analysis. Justice Windeyer 
once said — coincidentally, in an appeal linked to the divergence between 
the common law of Australia and the United Kingdom — that “like any 
attempt to trace the lineage of an idea, much depends on how far you 
wish to go back and how much certainty you demand in the connecting 
links”.60 But it is much easier to consider the more distant legal past 
in equity, where (at least in the British Commonwealth) there was no 
occasion for such a reformulation as occurred at common law. The “rule” 
in Saunders v Vautier is one instance. Another striking example is Pearne 
v Lisle,61 whose abhorrent subject matter nonetheless discloses principles 
pursuant to which specific performance will be refused where damages are 
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid at para 81 (the words are mine, with the agreement of Beazley P and 
Sackville AJA).
57. Ibid.
58. Cf. supra note 7.
59. Neil Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) at 187. 
60. Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd, [1966] HCA 40.
61. (1749), 27 ER 47 (Ch).
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an adequate remedy which have changed little in 260 years.62 As Justice 
Gummow has written, extra-judicially: “[i]n equity, the lineage of an idea 
may be quite clear and its persistence through changing circumstances all 
the more readily explicable”.63
It is as well to recall another signal historical difference between the 
two main branches of English law. As stated in Re Hallett’s Estate,64 “the 
rules of Courts of Equity are not, like the rules of the Common Law, 
supposed to have been established from time immemorial. It is … well 
known that they have been … from time to time — altered, improved, 
and refined. In many cases we know the names of the Chancellors 
who invented them”.65 The same point was made a century later by Sir 
Anthony Mason, stating that equity “made no secret of its evolutionary 
development”.66 That there can more or less readily be a direct link to the 
Chancellors who first formulated equitable doctrine can but enhance the 
capacity for fruitful and insightful use of foreign law.
C. Judicial Advice
The ability to bring a trust to an end is largely unregulated by statute 
in Australia and the United Kingdom, although the same is not true in 
many North American jurisdictions.67 But even in areas where statute 
has intruded (which are numerous), it can remain straightforward to 
apply a comparative approach to the development of equitable principle. 
Take for example judicial advice to trustees. Statute authorises a trustee 
to obtain the benefit of a statutory defence if the trustee follows advice 
62. Ibid (contract for the sale of slaves). 
63. William Gummow, Change and Continuity: Statute, Equity and Federalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 42. 
64. (1880), 13 Ch D 696 (CA (Eng)).
65. Ibid at 710.
66. Anthony Mason, “The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of 
Contract” (1998) 27:1 Anglo-American Law Review 1 at 3.
67. In Canada, provincial statutes in Alberta and Manitoba have qualified the 
“rule” in Saunders v Vautier, supra note 49, by making the termination 
of the trust subject to judicial consent, thereby conferring a discretion 
upon the court to approve directions overriding the settlor’s or testator’s 
intention. See Waters, Gillen & Smith, supra note 43 at 1258-62.
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given after full disclosure. It makes sense — given the character of the 
application and the nature of the defence — to regard this as essentially 
equitable. The subject was considered at length in Macedonian Orthodox 
Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Petar.68 The 
High Court of Australia there observed that where the New South Wales 
legislation “reflected and even copied laws enacted, or made, for identical 
or analogous circumstances in England, it was permissible and helpful 
to construe the New South Wales legislation with the benefit of the 
experience expressed in judicial observations on the English analogues”.69
Despite very significant differences in legislative history, the High 
Court pointed to what Lord St. Leonards had said in 1857 when 
introducing the Trustee Relief Bill as to its being a “cheap and simple 
process of determining questions”.70 Nevertheless, the High Court had 
regard to the significantly altered (and expanded) provisions in section 63 
of the New South Wales Trustee Act 192571 as warranting the result 
that there should be no limitation confining the availability of advice 
to non-adversarial proceedings. Thus, with or without the intrusion 
of local statute, bodies of law which remain unmistakably “equitable” 
recur throughout the British Commonwealth. Assistance is gained by 
having regard to decisions throughout the Commonwealth, as well as 
from works of legal scholarship on equity and trusts in applying and 
developing equitable principle. 
I am most familiar with Australian decisions. However, even a 
superficial examination of recent Canadian decisions tends to bear out 
the themes in this paper. For example, irrespective of the relative merits 
of the majority and the minority judgments, one cannot fail to be struck 
by the fact that in a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal on equitable estoppel, extensive regard was given to recent English 
decisions,72 or that Justice Barrett’s decision from my own court in Re 
68. [2008] HCA 42 [Petar].
69. Ibid at para 53. See also Beck, supra note 54 at paras 48-54.
70. Petar, supra note 68 at para 67.
71. No 14 (NSW)(Austl).
72. Sabey v von Hopffgarten Estate, 2014 BCCA 360.
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Gaydon73 has been applied in a series of decisions in Ontario and British 
Columbia.74 Conversely, the New South Wales decision Beck relied on 
a 1949 Canadian decision, In re the Trustee Act; In re Burger Estate,75 in 
support of issuing judicial advice in mandatory form. 
The Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia has recently 
observed that “[e]quity, as a reflection of underlying norms and 
values (and often expressed thus rather than by rules that are precisely 
linguistically expressed) required, necessarily, a form of judicial technique 
different to the common law”.76 
Those norms transcend national boundaries, and the judicial 
technique likewise straddles temporal and geographic limits. In short 
there is, as Lord Wilberforce said, a common legal approach, a closely 
interwoven fabric of legal doctrine, which permits regard to be had to the 
convincing language and reasoning in different countries’ courts in the 
Commonwealth.77
VI. Conclusion
One danger in any use of comparative law was identified by Justice 
Kriegler of the South African Constitutional Court:
because of the subtleties of foreign jurisdictions, their practices and 
terminology require more intensive study ... Even on a superficial view, there 
seem to me to be differences of substance between the statutory, jurisprudential 
and societal contexts prevailing in those countries and in South Africa as to 
render ostensible analogies dangerous without a thorough understanding of 
the foreign systems.78
This paper has sought to explain why those difficulties — which are 
undoubtedly real — are less significant in the case of equity throughout 
73. [2001] NSWSC 473.
74. See Lomas v Rio Algom Limited, 2010 ONCA 175, which in turn was 
applied in Mayer v Mayer, 2014 BCCA 293.
75. [1949] 1 WWR 280 (Alta (SC)).
76. Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, [2015] FCAFC 
50 at para 271 (Allsop CJ, Besanko and Middleton JJ agreeing).
77. Buttes Gas & Oil Co, supra note 13 at 936-37.
78. Bernstein v Bester NO, [1996] ZACC 2 (SA), cited by Markesinis & 
Fedtke, supra note 3 at 159.
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the Commonwealth. The result is that the use of comparative equity 
decisions is distinctive.
In advancing that argument, this paper has necessarily relied on a 
number of generalised propositions, illustrated by recent examples. It 
has not been possible within the confinement of this paper to undertake 
an empirical analysis79 (and which would also present large definitional 
issues).80 I do not mean to underplay those difficulties, although I do 
not regard them as insuperable. Although I have emphasised what is 
lost by generalisations as to the role of comparative law, I acknowledge 
that this paper unavoidably suffers from a similar vice. It may therefore 
best be seen as an overview of an attractive and plausible thesis. Those 
qualifications notwithstanding, it should be recalled that on any view 
the majority of civil litigation — contract, tort and statutory claims — 
does not involve the principled development or application of equitable 
principle. There is a distinctive character to the minority that does, which 
is shared throughout the Commonwealth and affects the ways in which a 
comparative approach is taken. 
79. Contrast Keith Stanton, “Comparative Law in the House of Lords and 
Supreme Court” (2013) 42:3 Common Law World Review 269.
80. I am conscious that the metes and bounds of “equity” and “equitable 
principle” are contestable and that whatever they be, much litigation has 
elements of both common law and equity.
